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Abstract—BGP route leaks frequently precipitate serious dis-
ruptions to inter-domain routing. These incidents have plagued
the Internet for decades while deployment and usability issues
cripple efforts to mitigate the problem. Peerlock, introduced
in 2016, addresses route leaks with a new approach. Peerlock
enables filtering agreements between transit providers to protect
their own networks without the need for broad cooperation
or a trust infrastructure. We outline the Peerlock system and
one variant, Peerlock-lite, and conduct live Internet experi-
ments to measure their deployment on the control plane. Our
measurements find evidence for significant Peerlock protection
between Tier 1 networks in the peering clique, where 48% of
potential Peerlock filters are deployed, and reveal that many
other networks also deploy filters against Tier 1 leaks. To
guide further deployment, we also quantify Peerlock’s impact
on route leaks both at currently observed levels and under
hypothetical future deployment scenarios via BGP simulation.
These experiments reveal present Peerlock deployment restricts
Tier 1 leak export to 10% or fewer networks for 40% of simulated
leaks. Strategic additional Peerlock-lite deployment at all large
ISPs (<1% of all networks), in tandem with Peerlock within the
peering clique as deployed, completely mitigates about 80% of
simulated Tier 1 route leaks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet consists of many Autonomous Systems (ASes)
with distinct IP prefixes, routing policies, and inter-AS con-
nections. These networks exchange routes with neighboring
ASes over the control plane to connect hosts in disparate
ASes and create the illusion for users of a single, unified
Internet. Unfortunately, there are few security controls on route
exchange. ASes behaving adversarially, whether intentionally
or by mistake, can export routes that should be kept internally
or shared with only a subset of their neighbors. Because the
language ASes use to communicate - the Border Gateway
Protocol or BGP - does not package validation information
with routes, remote networks often receive and propagate these
route leaks throughout the control plane. Leaks frequently
steer user traffic on the data plane onto unintended paths that
lack capacity for the additional traffic. The end result is soaring
latency or complete availability loss for destination services.
Recent route leaks to prefixes hosting major content/service
providers like Spotify [20], Cloudflare [22] and Google [10]
have highlighted the global impact of this problem.
Existing tools designed to curtail leaks, like the many
Internet Routing Registries (IRRs), are challenging to deploy
or limited in scope. IRRs are databases where ASes can
publish their routing policies. Other ASes can then convert
IRR-stored policies into filters to validate received routes. IRR-
based filtering is limited by its requirement for broad AS
participation, however, as the motivations and sophistication
of network operators varies greatly between ASes [21]. Other
BGP security extensions, like the Resource Public Key Infras-
tructure (RPKI), only enable filtering for a subset of leaks (e.g.
re-origination leaks for RPKI).
A novel leak defense system, Peerlock [17], was introduced
in 2016 to address the need for a deployable solution. Each
Peerlock deployment occurs between two peering ASes, the
protector AS and protected AS. The protector AS agrees to
filter routes that transit the protected AS unless they arrive
directly from the protected AS or one of its designated up-
streams. The filter prevents the protector AS from propagating
or steering its traffic onto any leaked route that transits the pro-
tected AS, regardless of origin AS/destination prefix. Peerlock
is designed to leverage the rich web of peering relationships
that exist between transit networks in the Internet’s core, and
functions without coordination with other ASes on potential
leak paths. This makes Peerlock especially viable in the
peering clique formed by the 19 Tier 1 ASes that sit atop the
inter-domain routing hierarchy. A related technique, Peerlock-
lite, enables networks to spot likely leaks without prior out-
of-band communication. ASes deploying Peerlock-lite drop
routes arriving from customers that contain a Tier 1 AS; it
is highly improbable that customers are providing transit for
large global networks.
Our first contribution is a measurement of
Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployment on the control plane.
In Section IV we design, execute, and evaluate active Internet
measurements to search for evidence of filtering consistent
with these systems. Our experiments use BGP poisoning, a
technique used in prior work for traffic engineering [40] and
path discovery [1], to mimic route leaks that transit some
target AS. We then listen for which networks propagate -
or filter - these "leaks" relative to control advertisements.
This information feeds several inference techniques designed
to uncover which ASes are Peerlocking for (protecting) the
target AS.
Notably, we find substantial Peerlock deployment within the
peering clique: about 48% of possible filtering rules (153/342)
are already implemented within this set. Further, many non-
Tier 1 ASes - including nearly 40% of large ISPs observed
during our experiments - perform some Peerlock-lite filtering
on Tier 1 AS leaks. Evidence for Peerlock filtering of non-Tier
1 leaks is virtually nonexistent, though three Tier 1 networks
(AS 12956, AS 2914, and AS 3320) each filter leaks for more
than 20 non-Tier 1 ASes.
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After detecting current Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployments,
we ask how well these systems mitigate Tier 1 leaks. Internet-
scale BGP simulations in Section V test over 6,000 simulated
Tier 1 leaks against observed Peerlock/Peerlock-lite levels to
quantify the effect of these systems as deployed. We test
the same leaks against six hypothetical extended deployment
scenarios to understand where additional filters should be
placed to isolate leaks.
We find that Peerlock filtering within the peering clique is
helpful, but not sufficient to mitigate Tier 1 route leaks on
its own. Consistent with prior work on BGP filtering [8], our
experiments show that positioning filters at relatively few ASes
- the roughly 600 large ISPs - can play a decisive role in leak
prevention. About 80% of simulated leaks were completely
mitigated by uniform Peerlock-lite filter deployment at large
ISPs, with fewer than 10% of leaks spreading beyond 10%
of the topology. These figures are especially encouraging
because Peerlock-lite is based on a simple route validity check
informed by the valley-free routing model [7] that requires no
out-of-band communication.
In this paper, we make the following key contributions:
• We give an overview of the Peerlock and Peerlock-
lite filtering systems, and consider their benefits and
limitations relative to existing tools in Section III.
• We describe how we adapt existing Internet measurement
techniques to probe Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployment on
the control plane and introduce a novel inference method
in Section IV-A.
• We actively measure where Peerlock and Peerlock-lite
filters are deployed with PEERING [34] and CAIDA’s
BGPStream [32] in Section IV-B, with a discussion of
results in Section IV-C.
• We simulate thousands of Tier 1 route leaks against
several protection scenarios in Section V-B, and present
a new path encoding method to understand how these
scenarios influence leak propagation and export in Sec-
tion V-C.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Border Gateway Protocol
The Internet is a confederation of about 67,000 smaller
networks, called Autonomous Systems or ASes. ASes exchange
routing information via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
to enable global connectivity. Each AS originates routes to its
hosted prefixes; these routes are advertised to neighbors via
BGP updates. Each update contains a prefix and a collection
of other attributes, including an AS PATH that describes the
route’s AS-level hops. ASes compare all received updates via
the BGP decision process to select a single best path to every
destination prefix. Both path qualities (like AS PATH length)
and local network policies (e.g., business relationship with
advertising AS) are taken in account when selecting a best
path, but policies take precedence in the process. Once an AS
selects a best path for a given prefix, it prepends its unique
AS number (ASN) to the path and advertises only that path to
its neighbors.
Paths learned from customer ASes - those purchasing
transit - are advertised to all connections. Provider-learned
routes, meanwhile, are generally only advertised to an AS’s
customers. Peer ASes exchange traffic without compensation,
and likewise advertise routes learned from one another only
to customer ASes. Limitations on non-customer learned route
export prevents customer ASes from transiting traffic between
peers/providers at its own expense. This dynamic, known as
the Gao-Rexford or valley-free routing model [7], guides the
exchange of routes on the control plane. No widely-deployed
mechanism enforces this model, but the economic incentives
it describes shape AS path export behavior.
The customer cone [9] is one product of this model. An AS’s
customer cone is the set of all ASes reachable from the AS
via only provider to customer links. Stated simply, these are
the AS’s direct and indirect customers. Customer cone size is
one of the few publicly observable features commonly used to
judge an AS’s influence on the control plane, e.g. in CAIDA’s
AS ranking [47]. Customer cone size is the basis for the UCLA
classification presented in [31] widely used in research on this
topic [39], [46], [1], [4], [50]. This scheme separates ASes into
1) Tier 1 ASes, who have no providers, form a peering clique,
and can transit traffic to any prefix without compensation, 2)
large ISPs with more than 50 customer cone ASes, 3) small
ISPs with 5-50 customer cone ASes, and 4) stub ASes with
fewer than 5 direct/indirect customers.
B. Route Leaks
Despite its vital role in binding together Internet networks,
BGP is missing key security features like cryptographic hard-
ening of routes exchanged between ASes or trusted certifi-
cation binding ASes to owned prefixes. This leads to two
common classes of major inter-domain routing mishaps, prefix
hijacking and route leaks. Prefix hijacks occur when a net-
work, often unintentionally, originates or advertises a fake but
attractive (e.g. shorter) route to prefixes owned by another
AS. Traffic destined for those prefixes is then intercepted
by the hijacker. A number of recent studies focus on hijack
mitigation [37], [33], [49].
Route leaks are defined in RFC 7908 as the propagation
of an advertisement beyond its intended scope [42]. Type 1-
4 leaks all cover various valley-free routing violations, i.e.
advertising one peer/provider’s routes to another peer/provider.
Because remote ASes have little or no information on rela-
tionships between non-neighboring networks, they generally
cannot distinguish leaks from valid routes, and may propagate
them throughout the topology. Type 5 leaks occur when one
provider’s routes are announced to another with the AS PATH
stripped, effectively re-originating the prefix from the leaker.
Finally, a Type 6 leak involves an AS announcing routes used
internally to its neighbors. These routes are often more specific
than externally announced routes; this makes the leaks more
attractive in the BGP decision process and encourages their
spread to other remote networks.
Globally disruptive route leaks occur frequently [20], [38],
[10], [26], [51], [25]. The 2019 Verizon-Cloudflare leak [22]
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is a high profile example. A small ISP, AS 33154, leaked
specific internal prefixes (Type 6) to Cloudflare and many
other destinations to its customer, AS 396531. AS 396531
committed a Type 1 leak by advertising this route to its
other provider, AS 701 Verizon. Verizon propagated the leak,
which spread widely on the control plane because it was
more specific than legitimate available routes (see depiction in
Fig. 1). Traffic for Cloudflare, a leading content distribution
network (CDN), was funneled through small networks. Many
of the thousands of websites and services backed by Cloud-
flare suffered degraded service until the leak was resolved
via out-of-band communication between Cloudflare and AS
33154 [45].
e
Fig. 1: 2019 Verizon/Cloudflare leak. Other destination ser-
vices were also affected.
C. Route Leak Prevention
There are a number of tools available to assist network
operators in preventing route leaks. The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure [24] is a trusted repository for certificates that
bind IP prefixes to owning ASes’s public keys, called Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs). Remote networks can validate
BGP updates against ROAs in the RPKI, a process called
Route Origin Validation (ROV). Widespread ROV filtering
could prevent Type 5 leaks and many prefix hijacking attacks.
Unfortunately, ROA/ROV deployment has suffered from cir-
cular deployment logic; it is meaningless for origin ASes to
invest in publishing ROAs until ROV is widely implemented,
but ROV is ineffective without ROAs. This issue has been
identified as a major obstacle to ROV deployment [8], [11].
NIST estimates that just 20% of prefixes are covered by a
valid ROA [29].
Internet routing registries (IRRs) back another leak pre-
vention system. IRRs are databases where AS operators can
store their routing policies. Remote networks can ingest these
policies to inform filters that block unintended/invalid ad-
vertisements. IRR databases are operated by private firms,
regional Internet registries, and other interests [14], and policy
entries are often mirrored between them. A complete, up-
to-date IRR would eliminate many Type 1-4 route leaks.
Like ROV filtering, though, IRR filtering is hampered by
deployment headaches. ASes’ routing policies are interdepen-
dent, so changes to one network’s stored policies can render
many others obsolete. Operators in smaller, resource-limited
networks can avoid periodic updates by configuring permissive
routing policies; large transit ASes have complex, dynamic
routing policies that require frequent changes to dependent
networks’ filters [21]. These issues, combined with poor or
non-existent authentication, have resulted in inconsistent and
out-of-date IRRs. Though leading organizations like RIPE
have launched efforts to improve IRR quality [28], operator
incentive and dependency issues will continue to limit their
usefulness.
Other filtering techniques include max-prefix limit filtering,
where a network caps the number of prefixes it will accept
from a neighbor. This prevents mass prefix spills like the 2017
Level 3 leak [26], but not more targeted (yet highly disruptive)
leaks like the Verizon/Cloudflare incident described earlier.
BGPSec [23] is a protocol extension for cryptographic AS
path hardening. This would prevent some types of hijacking,
but BGPSec has not been commercially implemented and is
not designed to prevent route leaks.
Finally, a communities-based "down-only" (DO) leak solu-
tion has been proposed [43]. Large BGP communities [41] are
signals containing three integers that can be attached to routes.
The DO system relies on providers/peers marking a route
"down-only" using the first two integers in a large community,
with their ASN included as the third integer, before passing the
route to customers or peers. If these customers/peers attempt
to re-advertise the route to other providers/peers, the attached
DO community will clearly signal a route leak. While this
system would prevent many leaks if properly implemented,
it relies on customers/peers preserving DO information when
propagating advertisements. Moreover, some leaks - like the
internal route leaks in the Verizon/Cloudflare incident - would
not be arrested by this system.
D. BGP Poisoning
BGP poisoning is a technique designed to manipulate the
BGP decision process in remote networks. ASes originating a
prefix can poison an advertisement by including the ASNs
of remote networks in the AS PATH. Often, the poisoned
ASNs will be inserted between copies of the origin’s ASN.
This "sandwiching" ensures traffic is routed properly and that
the advertisement is valid for ROV filtering purposes (see
Fig. 2). BGP prevents cycles from forming in the topology
by requiring ASes to drop routes containing their own ASN
in the AS PATH; this is known as BGP loop detection. So,
all networks included in the poisoned update’s AS PATH -
the poisoned ASes - will filter it. Poisons can be used for
inbound traffic engineering purposes [40], [39], [19] but we
employ them in Section IV to mimic route leaks transiting the
poisoned AS.
III. THE PEERLOCK SYSTEM
The challenge of leak filtering stems from the topological
scope asymmetry between BGP routes and the perspective
of individual AS operators who evaluate them. Routes span
the topology (global scope); operators only know their own
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Fig. 2: BGP poisoning. AS 1 originates a route with AS
2 prepended to path; AS 2 filters the update, but AS 3
propagates.
relationships with adjoining ASes (local scope). Filtering
systems built on the RPKI [12] and IRRs [13] partially address
this asymmetry by applying additional information to the
route evaluation process. However, these existing solutions
have limitations that have hamstrung their deployment. Most
critically, their effectiveness depends on the cooperation of
many unincentivized remote ASes as detailed in Section II-C.
A. Peerlock
Peerlock [17] is a relatively new (2016) leak filtering
scheme based on out-of-band information exchange between
BGP peers. Peerlock requires a single AS (the protected AS)
to designate authorized upstreams to their BGP peer (the
protector AS). This communication distributes AS relationship
information between peers to decrease route/filterer scope
asymmetry. The protector AS then rejects any BGP update
whose AS PATH contains the protected AS unless received
1) directly from the protected AS, or 2) from an authorized
upstream, with the protected AS immediately following the
authorized upstream in the AS PATH. We say that the protector
AS is Peerlocking the protected AS. See Figure 3 for a
depiction of the system. In this paper, we will often refer to
a single instance of Peerlock - that is, one protector/protected
pairing - as a Peerlock rule.
Fig. 3: Simple Peerlock deployment. Protector AS filters
updates containing the peer Protected AS from unauthorized
propagators.
Peerlock has a number of benefits over previous leak
prevention systems, including:
Incentive alignment: Unlike previous leak prevention sys-
tems, Peerlock does not rely on cooperation across many ASes.
Each Peerlock rule is strictly two party, relying only on out-
of-band information exchange between the protected AS and
its (directly adjacent) peers. After this initial setup, any leak
that transits the protected AS can be filtered regardless of
origin. Contrast this with IRR filtering, whose final quality
is determined by the freshness/correctness of policies stored
by all ASes along a potential leak propagation path [21]. This
is a key feature for Peerlock given ASes’ varied incentives and
available resources.
Deployability: Peerlock rules are simple to configure. The
protector AS installs an AS PATH filter for received BGP
updates that include the protected ASN. Any route leak of the
protected AS can then be filtered by the protector, regardless
of the destination prefix. ROV, by comparison, requires that
each origin AS publish a ROA for their prefixes to the RPKI.
Maintainability: Finally, Peerlock rules are backed by ex-
isting trust relationships with peers on an ad-hoc basis. This
means that Peerlock does not require a distributed trust frame-
work like the RPKI, or maintenance of complex policy object
databases as in IRR filtering. Protector ASes need only to track
their own rules with peers. Moreover, Peerlock rule changes
are self-contained and do not affect other rules. This avoids
the cascading dependency problem exhibited by IRRs, where
one AS’s policy changes may render many other AS’s entries
obsolete.
Peerlock also has significant limitations, including:
Scalability: There is no automated way to configure a Peerlock
rule, although at least one method has been proposed [15]. This
means that protected ASes must manually configure/change
rules for each of their peers to be fully protected. Addition-
ally, Peerlock rules can only be established within a peering
relationship, although this limitation is less significant than it
first appears. The Tier 1 networks form a peering clique by
definition, and large ISPs peer with about 32 other large ISPs
on average according to CAIDA’s inferred topology from May
2020 [48]. Our work later in Section V indicates that peering
links between transit networks in the Internet’s core form a
major channel for global route propagation.
Security: Peerlock lacks a standard to describe how out-
of-band information is exchanged between peers. Without a
detailed and secure protocol for rule configuration, Peerlock is
vulnerable to exploitation; fraudulent rules affect route export,
and could be used to engineer traffic flows. Furthermore, when
operators are left to define their own protocol, they lack a
secure, vetted standard to follow.
Flexibility: Operating at the AS level simplifies Peerlock
deployment, but it does result in decreased flexibility relative
to IRR/ROV filtering. These existing systems allow ASes
to describe policies at the per-prefix level. Peerlock also
does not catch Type 5 (re-origination) leaks, meaning it is
complementary to ROV filtering and not a replacement.
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B. Peerlock-lite
Peerlock-lite [17] (or Tier 1 filter, "big networks" filter)
is a related technique, based on the assumption that transit
providers should never receive a route whose AS PATH in-
cludes a Tier 1 AS from a customer. This is a valid assumption
under the valley-free routing model [7], because such an
update implies the customer is providing transit for the Tier 1
AS; otherwise, the customer would not export (leak) the route
to another provider. However, Tier 1 ASes have no providers
by definition. This logic can be extended heuristically to any
other large non-Tier 1 networks that the provider does not
expect the customer to export.
This simple logic yields an equally simple filtering rule
for transit providers - reject any updates from customers that
contain a Tier 1/large transit ASN. See Fig. 4 for a depiction of
this filtering technique. Peerlock-lite filters are limited to Tier
1/large transit provider leaks, but they require no out-of-band
information to configure. Moreover, Tier 1 ASes’ position at
the Internet’s core results in their frequent presence on AS
PATHs of highly disruptive leaks, e.g. the Verizon/Cloudflare
leak [22] and the Enzu/AWS/Spotify leak [20].
Fig. 4: Example Peerlock-lite deployment. Provider AS filters
updates that include a Tier 1 AS from its customer.
IV. MEASURING PEERLOCK DEPLOYMENT
Our initial experiments seek to establish the current state of
Peerlock deployment on the control plane. As discussed in the
previous section, every Peerlock rule is configured between a
pair of networks: the protector AS and the protected AS. Each
of the experiments in this section works to identify some or
all Peerlock/Peerlock-lite protectors for a targeted AS.
A. Measurement Methodology
Experimental Design: Each set of measurement experiments
in this section is designed to discover Peerlock rules for a
set of potential protected ASes, called target ASes. For each
target AS, we advertise a /24 prefix from many points-of-
presence (PoPs) on the control plane. This is the control
advertisement. It is a normal /24 origination in every way,
except that our university AS - which we know not to be
protected by any Peerlock rule - is poisoned (i.e., prepended
to the advertisement’s AS PATH - see Section II-D). We then
listen at varied collection sites, called collectors, for BGP
updates triggered by our advertisement. The AS PATH for each
such update that arrives at collectors lists in encounter order
the ASes that received and re-issued the update as described
in Section II-A.
Taken together, the gathered AS PATHs form a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) that describes the control advertisement’s
propagation through the control plane; each AS appearing
on at least one AS PATH forms a node in the DAG, and
AS ordering within paths allows us to form directed edges
between nodes. BGP loop detection prevents cycles as noted
in Section II-D. We call this graph the control DAG. Note that
all of the ASes appearing in the control DAG propagated (and
thus did not filter) control updates that include a poisoned AS.
We then wait 30 minutes for update propagation before
issuing an explicit withdrawal for the /24 prefix. This timing
is built conservatively from empirical measurements of propa-
gation times through the control plane (see update propagation
experiments in appendix). After another waiting period to
ensure the withdrawal has completely propagated, we issue a
leak advertisement for the same /24 prefix. This advertisement
matches the control advertisement in every way, except that
the target AS is poisoned.
This leak advertisement structure is designed to mimic
a leak for the purposes of Peerlock while avoiding other
common filtering systems. The target AS’s presence on up-
date paths triggers filtering for any Peerlock protector ASes.
However, since the leak and control advertisements share an
origin AS/prefix, their updates present the same for ROV
filtering purposes. Additionally, since we observe all ASes
in the control DAG propagating control updates, we infer
those ASes will not apply IRR or max-prefix limit filtering
to the same /24 in leak updates. Finally, while prior work
indicates that short poisoned paths are common [46] and rarely
filtered [39], the poisoning in the control advertisement ensures
that we do not conflate poison filtering and Peerlocking. We
acknowledge that other, AS-specific filtering techniques may
be applied to updates, but we saw little evidence of these
policies during our experiments.
Finally, we gather all BGP updates for the leak advertise-
ment from our collectors. The ASes that appear on AS PATHs
in any of these updates are added to a set called the leak set.
Since they propagated poisoned updates, we know these ASes
did not filter the "leak". With the control DAG and leak set
together, we can reason about which ASes are Peerlocking for
the target AS using two techniques: 1) clique inference and 2)
DAG inference.
For detecting Tier 1 protector ASes, we use clique inference.
This simple technique relies on the fact that Tier 1 ASes
form a peering clique by definition. According to the valley-
free routing model [7], ASes share all updates received from
customers with their peers; this maximizes the traffic the AS
transits for its customers (and thus the AS operator’s compen-
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Fig. 5: Measurement experiment depiction. Inferences are
made about Peerlock deployment based on differences be-
tween normal updates (left) vs. poisoned updates (right) ar-
riving at collectors.
sation). Further, ASes should not share a peer’s updates with
another peer, as this is a Type 2 route leak [42]. So, in general,
if a Tier 1 AS is observed propagating an update, all Tier
1s should receive the update via their peering relationships.
Because we observe at least one Tier 1 propagating control
and leak updates across all experiments, we define a simple
rule for inferring Tier 1 protector ASes: any Tier 1 AS that
appears in the control DAG but not the leak set is Peerlocking
for the target AS.
Inferring other protector ASes requires a more general tech-
nique. Outside the structural guarantees provided by the Tier
1 clique, there is significantly more uncertainty about which
networks are filtering leak updates. Specifically, it is difficult
to distinguish an AS filtering updates from an AS not receiving
updates at all due to filtering by other upstream/downstream
networks. This challenge leads us to make three separate
inferences for these ASes for each leak target.
First and simplest is the max inference set, defined as all
control DAG ASes minus the leak set. This set includes all
ASes who may have filtered leak updates, but also ASes who
did not receive the leak update because it was filtered by an
intermediate AS. Secondly, we build a min inference set. This
set is built by deleting all leak set ASes from the control
DAG, and collecting the root of every weakly connected
component that remains. This isolates the ASes that filtered
leak updates from ASes in their "shadow" who did not receive
the updates. The min inference set contains those ASes who
likely filtered leak updates based on routes we observed. Note
that the min/max inference techniques closely align with those
employed in the long path filtering experiments in Smith et
al.’s study on BGP poisoning as a re-routing primitive [39].
Our last inference set is the likely inference. Because ASes
only export their best path to our /24 prefix, we cannot
observe every edge that should exist in the control DAG (i.e.,
every potential propagation path for updates). So, this set’s
is built like the min inference set, except that we augment
the control DAG with edges from CAIDA’s provider-peer
observed customer cone inference [48]. That is, we add edges
to the control DAG where CAIDA’s data indicates there are
links between ASes that we did not observe due to policy
decisions. This forms a superset of the min inference set and
a subset of the max inference set that contains the most likely
filterers. This is a novel technique not used to our knowledge
in any prior work on this topic.
These three inference sets are formed for each target
from differences in control and leak update propagation. In
addition to these sets, we also build a min/max/likely poison
filtering set by following the same steps listed above, but
with a unpoisoned advertisement’s updates compared against
the control advertisement’s updates. These sets are built to
explore the prevalence of general poison filtering as in Smith
et al. [39].
Framework Details and Stability: The control-plane mea-
surement framework for these experiments consists of 1) 13
PoPs to issue BGP advertisements and 2) 54 BGP collectors to
listen for propagation. We employ the PEERING testbed [34]
for the first requirement. PEERING allows us to advertise
three assigned /24 prefixes from edge routers at thirteen PoPs
worldwide. For collecting BGP updates, we used CAIDA’s
BGPStream [48] tool. This tool draws updates from 54 glob-
ally distributed collectors, including 30 RouteViews [30] and
24 RIPE RIS [27] collectors. While most of these collectors
are positioned in North America and Europe, every populated
continent is represented by at least one collector.
BGP policies prohibit us from viewing the entirety of the
topology with this framework; there are few collectors in
stub networks, and stub/remote ASes do not export received
updates back "up" through provider networks. This means our
observation window - the ASes on update paths at collectors
- is biased toward transit networks in the Internet’s core
as in [31]. Fortunately, this is the most important/influential
region to monitor, as these network’s policies have the widest
impact on the control plane. Altogether, we observed 610 ASes
during our experiments, including 181/605 large ISPs and all
19 Tier 1 networks. Most observed ASes (332) were present
in the observation window during all experiments conducted
from August 2019-May 2020. Note that while we can only
infer protector ASes from our observation window, we can
poison any AS. So, our window does not limit our inference
regarding which ASes are protected.
To account for instability in our observation window, we
limit our filtering inferences to those ASes observed in control
updates both before and after the leak advertisement (i.e., for
the current and next target AS experiment). Additionally, we
repeat experiments - issue control/leak advertisements for the
same target ASes - over several months. These observations
are combined to reduce the "noise" of topological dynamism
from our inferences. Specifically, we remove ASes from
a target’s filtering inference sets if we later observe them
propagating a leak update for that target; in this case, the
earlier inference was likely caused by the AS’s intermittent
presence in the observation window during the experiment.
Ethics: We issued only well-formed BGP advertisements
using the PEERING software client and adhered to all rules
published by PEERING. We advertised only our assigned /24
prefixes, which are reserved for experimental use, and thus did
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not disturb Internet control or data plane operation for any
non-experimental IP addresses. Our experiments did require
poisoned advertisements, but this is a common practice used
both in research [2], [39] and in traffic engineering [46]. One
network operator observed and inquired about our experiments
to PEERING, but did not report any resultant adverse effects.
No data-plane traffic was sent during the conduct of our
experiments.
B. Evaluation
Target Set 1, Tier 1s: The 19 Tier 1 ASes form our first
target AS set, i.e. the potential protected ASes for which we
are inferring Peerlock rules. The Tier 1 peering clique includes
the most influential networks by one of the few observable
metrics, customer cone size [48], and often creates [26] or
distributes [22], [10], [38] leaks that disrupt global Internet
services. Paradoxically, deploying filters for leaks that include
Tier 1 ASes is also relatively simple for non-Tier 1 networks
via the Peerlock-lite system described above. We iteratively
issued unpoisoned, control, and leak advertisements that cov-
ered this set every two months from August 2019 to May
2020. This repetition allows us to capture filtering rules for
ASes with inconsistent presence in our observation window,
and to explore how deployments change over time.
We first present results for protection within the Tier 1
clique in Fig. 6. Note that because of BGP loop detection,
every AS filters leak updates that include their own ASN
regardless of Peerlock deployment. The peering clique is
fortunately the most stable feature in our observation window,
enabling us to measure the presence/absence of nearly every
potential Peerlock rule within the clique. We have marked
the exceptions for which we were unable to measure filtering
rules in pink in Fig. 6. We see that Peerlock deployment is
significant but unevenly distributed within the clique. Some
ASes - e.g. AS 2914 NTT, AS 701 Verizon - filter leak
updates for virtually the entire clique. For five others - e.g.
AS 3491 PCCW Global, AS 6762 Telecom Italia - we found
no evidence of Tier 1 Peerlock filtering at all.
Our measurement results for Peerlock/Peerlock-lite
protection of Tier 1s by all observed ASes are depicted
in Fig. 7. Fig 7a shows both our inferences about which
networks filter poisoned updates in general (blue lines) and
which filter Tier 1 leaks (red lines). These are displayed as a
cumulative distribution function (CDF) over Tier 1 targets;
likely inferred filtering levels range from about 3% (AS
6830) to 15% (AS 701) of observed ASes. Note that per
the experimental design described above, we cannot make
Peerlock protection inferences for ASes filtering all poisoned
updates; however, this is a small set without Tier 1/large
ISP members (max inference size = 9 ASes). Fig. 7 shows
the number of ASes in each UCLA class (see Section II)
protecting at least one Tier 1 target.
Target Set 2, Tier 1 Peers: Our second target set includes
the non-Tier 1 peers of Tier 1 ASes (about 600 ASes) as
inferred by CAIDA [48]. These experiments explore whether
Tier 1 ASes are extending Peerlock protection to their non-
Tier 1 peers. Additionally, despite covering about 1% of all
ASes, this set includes a third of all large ISPs. This means
we can additionally investigate whether non-Tier 1 ASes
apply Peerlock-lite filters to large transit networks outside the
peering clique. These experiments were conducted from Oct
2019 to May 2020, with every peer ASN targeted at least
twice.
The overall results are presented in Fig. 8a. Clearly, filtering
for these leaks is less prevalent within our observation window.
80% of Tier 1 peer leaks were filtered by fewer than 2%
of observed ASes, but a few exceptional targets did trigger
significant filtering behavior. Our poison filtering inference
for these targets is, as expected, nearly identical to that
derived from the Tier 1 leak experiments. Fig. 8b displays
filtering levels for each Tier 1 ASes by peering status with
the target. All Tier 1s protect 10 or fewer peer networks from
this set. More variance exists in non-peer filtering behavior;
this dynamic will be explored more fully in the following
discussion.
C. Discussion
Consistent with Smith et al. [39], we find no evidence
for widespread filtering of otherwise unremarkable poisoned
paths. Their study also found that poisoning high degree
ASes in an update is associated with reduced propagation.
Specifically, sub-20% update propagation rates were observed
for some Tier 1 ASes, including AS 174 (Cogent/Tier 1)
and AS 3356 (Level 3/Tier 1). Birge-Lee et al. [2] likewise
found that using AS poisoning rather than communities as
a path export control primitive significantly reduced update
spread, especially when large transit providers were poisoned.
Defensive AS-path filtering (e.g.,Peerlock/Peerlock-lite)
is identified as a likely culprit for this effect. Our work
systematically examines how and where these filters are
deployed on the control plane (within the limits of our
observation window).
Tier 1 Leak Filtering: The greatest protection within our
observation window is clearly afforded to Tier 1 ASes. Our
initial experiments in August 2019 discovered evidence for
133/342 (192−19) possible Tier 1-Tier 1 filtering rules (about
39%). Each measurement that followed uncovered at least
two new filtering rules, and by our final experiment in May
2020, 153 rules had been observed, a nearly 15% uptick in
Peerlock deployment. We had previously observed a negative
filtering result for every additional rule, indicating this increase
results from genuinely new Peerlock deployments rather than
instability in the observation window.
Non-Tier 1 ASes also filter Tier 1 leaks, though this
behavior is far from uniform. Overall, Tier 1 leak filtering
ranged from 3% to 15% of observed ASes across Tier 1 AS
targets. Most of this is likely due to Peerlock-lite filtering, as
it is simpler to deploy. Moreover, fewer than 10% of the more
than 1,000 observed Tier 1 filtering rules exist between peers,
and only about 20% (236 rules) involved a Tier 1’s indirect
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(a) Number of protector/protected rules by ASN. (b) Depiction of Tier 1 protection rules.
Fig. 6: Tier 1s filtering Tier 1 leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
(a) Blue lines show poison filtering; red lines depict Tier 1 leak filtering. (b) Blue bars show no. ASes in observation window; red bars show no.
ASes filtering at least 1 Tier 1 leak.
Fig. 7: Overall filtering of Tier 1 leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
customers filtering leak updates. This suggests that ASes are
installing Peerlock-lite filters for all Tier 1s rather than simply
protecting their upstream providers.
Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) [6]
is an initiative whose ISP members agree to best routing prac-
tices (like AS path filtering) to secure inter-domain routing.
While Peerlock and Peerlock-lite are not specifically included
in MANRS expected filtering actions, they are both suggested
in the implementation guide. Fig.9 displays as a CDF the
proportion of MANRS and non-MANRS ASes filtering Tier
1 leaks. 73 of 502 MANRS ASes fall within our observation
window; the proportion of observed MANRS ASes that filtered
Tier 1 leaks ranged from 2-18% depending on Tier 1 target.
Non-MANRS filtering for the same targets ranged from 2-
12%.
As shown in Fig 7b, the proportion of ASes with Tier
1 leak filters rises with UCLA class [31]. Intuitively,
networks with larger customer cones have the resources for
sophisticated configurations and the imperative to prevent
issues for downstream customers, and have previously been
associated with differing responses to BGP events [39], [3].
This dynamic hampers systems requiring wide participation
like ROV [8] and IRR filtering [21], but does not limit
Peerlock or Peerlock-lite deployment.
Tier 1 Peer Leak Filtering: Our non-Tier 1 leak experi-
ments met with relatively sporadic filtering. For more than
80% of targets in this set, nearly every observation window
AS (>=98%) propagated leaks. As described in Section III,
Peerlock-lite filters for non-Tier 1 ASes require more careful
deployment. The outliers in this target set (see the long tail
in Fig. 8a) are invariably near-Tier 1 networks like AS 1273
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(a) Overall filtering levels for Tier 1 peer leaks. Max and likely poison
inferences match for this set.
(b) Tier 1 filtering of Tier 1 peer leaks (peers within clique excluded).
Fig. 8: Tier 1 peer leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
Vodafone, AS 6939 Hurricane Electric, and AS 7843 Charter
that are safe for most ASes to include in a Peerlock-lite filter.
Tier 1 filtering of this leak set was likewise reduced com-
pared to Tier 1 leaks. In general, Tier 1 networks deploy
fewer than 5 Peerlock filters for non-clique peers. Nearly
all of these cover near-Tier 1s like AS 7922 Comcast and
AS 1273 Vodafone, or ASes administered by Tier 1s e.g.
AS 702/703 Verizon and AS 3549 Level 3. Notably, three
networks extend protection to more than 15 non-peers (per
CAIDA’s inference). AS 2914 NTT’s non-peer filtering rules
all cover various Comcast ASNs, while AS 12956 Telefonica’s
rules appear to be regionally-based: zero rules are applied
to customer cone ASes, but 23/31 apply to other European
ISPs of varying size. 13/20 of AS 3320 Deutsche Telecom’s
non-peer filtering rules, on the other hand, cover ASes within
its customer cone. These non-peer rules may represent either
custom non-Peerlock filtering deployments or mis-inferences
in CAIDA’s relationship dataset.
In summary, Peerlock is widely deployed and expanding
within the peering clique. Deployment outside the peering
clique is relatively limited, however. Up to 20% of non-clique
networks also deploy Peerlock-lite (or a similar mechanism)
to filter leaks containing Tier 1 or near-Tier 1 ASes. These
deployments are proportionally more common in ISPs and
rarely seen in stub ASes within our observation window. Fortu-
nately, the effectiveness of Peerlock/Peerlock-lite deployments
is less sensitive to scattershot deployment than other filtering
solutions. Prior work [8] and our simulations in the following
Section V suggest that filtering by large ISPs can have an
outsize impact on global leak propagation.
V. EXPLORING PEERLOCK’S PRACTICAL IMPACT
The substantial but limited Peerlock/Peerlock-lite filtering
measured in the previous section leads us to investigate these
Fig. 9: Tier 1 leak filtering for MANRS/non-MANRS ASes.
systems’ protective benefit in partial deployment. We have
interest both in how well these systems protect the control
plane from Tier 1 leaks as deployed, and in the relative effect
of realistic additional deployment (i.e., adding filters at large
transit networks). To answer these questions, we quantify
the practical impact of Peerlock with Internet-scale simula-
tions that test thousands of leaks against several deployment
schemes.
A. Simulation Methodology
These experiments are conducted via extensions to a BGP
simulator, an approach consistent with prior work on this
topic [36], [35], [40], [46]. We construct a simulated AS-
level topology from CAIDA’s inferred relationship dataset
(Jan. 2020 data) [48]. ASes within the topology evaluate
and export routes using the BGP decision process; longest-
prefix matching, LOCAL PREF, and AS PATH guide path
selection, while route export is governed by local policy to
enforce valley-free routing. This ensures the simulator models
the central dynamic of control plane propagation - the Gao-
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Rexford model [7]. This is the closest approximation of control
plane behavior we can devise without ASes’ full (private)
routing policies.
Each simulation is driven by a protection scenario that
maps protector ASes to those they are protecting. As with
Peerlock in practice, these protectors drop all received routes
that transit a protected AS unless they arrive directly from that
AS. Some scenarios also include Peerlock-lite deployments;
for these experiments, some set of ASes filter all customer-
exported routes that transit Tier 1 ASes. Once we establish the
protection scenario, we iterate over all Tier 1 to Tier 1 links
(with 19 Tier 1 ASes, this is n = 20, n2 − n = 342 links).
These links describe a unidirectional connection from one Tier
1, called the link start, to another Tier 1, called the link end.
For every link in this set, we sample 20 ASes from the link
start’s customer cone to serve as leakers. Each leaker will,
in turn, randomly select a destination AS in the link end’s
customer cone, and advertise a route to the destination over
the link to all of its peers/providers (see Fig. 10). This models
a Type 1 route leak of a path over the peering clique [42]. After
the leak, we allow the topology to converge and measure how
many ASes 1) received leak updates and 2) installed the leak
path. Additionally, we capture all the AS PATH of all leak
updates for analysis. With 20 leaker/destination pairings per
link and 342 Tier 1 links, our results include 6,840 simulated
leaks.
Fig. 10: Example simulated leak. Dashed red lines indicate
route leak to other providers/peers.
Our simulations focus on leaks with Tier 1 leaks for
two reasons. First, we do not find substantial real-world
Peerlock/Peerlock-lite protection of non-Tier 1 ASes as out-
lined in Section IV. Second, many consequential leaks are
propagated globally over the Tier 1 backbone, e.g. [26], [22],
[38], [10]. Some of our protection schemes will investigate
whether leaks can propagate throughout the Internet without
Tier 1 distribution.
B. Evaluation
We evaluate seven different protection schemes for Tier 1
leaks.
• No filters.
• Inferred: Tier 1 Peerlock levels observed during Internet
measurements.
• Full T1: All Tier 1s Peerlock for all other Tier 1s.
• Full T1 + large ISP lock: Same as full T1, but all
large ISPs (376 ASes in CAIDA Jan 2020 dataset [48])
Peerlock their Tier 1 peers.
• Full T1 + large ISP lite: Same as full T1, but all large
ISPs deploy Peerlock-lite to protect clique ASes.
• Full T1 + large ISP both: Same as full T1, but all large
ISPs deploy Peerlock-lite filters and Peerlock for their
Tier 1 peers.
• Inferred + large ISP lite: Same as inferred, but all large
ISPs deploy Peerlock-lite.
While it is simpler to filter customer-learned routes with
Peerlock-lite than to deploy Tier 1 Peerlock filters for large
ISPs, we include both Peerlock and Peerlock-lite filtering by
these ASes to study how leaks are propagated within the
topology. The results of these experiments are presented in
Fig. 11, which displays both the proportion of ASes in the
topology receiving leak updates (Fig. 11a), and the proportion
selecting/exporting the leak path (Fig. 11b).
A critical feature revealed by Fig. 11 is the insufficiency of
Tier 1 protection alone (blue lines). Full Tier 1 Peerlocking
prevents all distribution of studied leaks over the peering
clique, but leak updates still spread to the majority of the
topology for most experiments. Adding large ISP Peerlock
protection has a relatively significant impact on both propaga-
tion and installation. However, Peerlock is limited to peering
partners, and about 2/3 of large ISPs have no Tier 1 peering
partners (68% for Jan 2020 dataset). The remainder peer with
some subset of the clique.
So, Peerlock-lite deployment by these ASes (red lines)
benefits from more filterers with wider protection per filterer.
Naturally, these scenarios are much more effective at prevent-
ing propagation. For most leak cases, less than 10% of the
topology receives leak updates. This highlights the leverage
large ISPs have within the topology; filtering at these ASes
(<1% of all networks) generates an extensive shielding effect.
The distinct "shoulder" on the Peerlock-lite curves in Fig. 11b
suggests the impact on ASes using the leak is even more
pronounced. There is virtually no impact on target link usage
for 75% of simulated leaks when Peerlock-lite is deployed by
all large ISPs. Interestingly, the combination of Peerlock and
Peerlock-lite filtering by large ISPs (purple line) adds little
value over Peerlock-lite alone.
C. Discussion
Path Encoding: To analyze how each of these scenarios
shapes leak propagation (and route selection/export), we col-
lect the AS PATH of all leaks exported during the above
experiments. We use a novel path encoding whereby each
AS on leak AS PATHs is converted to a 2-tuple with the
form (relationship to next AS, UCLA class [31]). Only the AS
PATH segment from the first customer to provider link to the
leaker ASN - the leak segment - is encoded. This trimming
discards the "down" segment prepended as leaks propagate
within customer cones, as well as the the segment connecting
leaker and destination that is invariant across leaks. We include
AS relationship in the encoding because of its importance in
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(a) Impact of various deployment scenaiors on leak update propagation. (b) Note increased Peerlock-lite performance for path switching vs. leak
update propagation.
Fig. 11: Tier 1 peer leaks, 2019/2020 measurements.
path export behavior as described in Section II-A; UCLA class
informs us regarding where leaks travel through the routing
hierarchy. Taken together, these factors help us understand
broadly the topological dynamics at play in leak propagation,
and to capture the dominant leak propagation vectors under
each protection scenario.
Relationship is encoded as "C" (customer), "R" (peer), or
"P" (provider). UCLA classes are indicated by "T" (Tier 1),
"L" (large ISP), "S" (small ISP), and "U" (stub). Example:
[LR, TP] encodes a leak path exported to a Tier 1 provider by
the leaker, who then passes the leak to a large ISP peer. The
progress of the leak through the large ISP’s customer cone
would continue to the left of "LR", and the path from leaker
to destination would continue to the right of "TP", but these
segments are omitted as explained above.
We will use two tables in analyzing our results. Table 1 de-
picts the three most common leak encodings for each scenario;
these account for at least a quarter of leak paths regardless
of filter placement. We also list the sum and percentage of
ASes exporting leaks accounted for by each encoding. Table
2 gives summary statistics for leak segments, including their
average length and the percentage of leak segments transiting
each UCLA class. Because we do not encode customer cone
propagation in leak segments, stubs are transited in <10% of
paths across all protection scenarios, are are omitted from the
table.
First, we observe that even under the "no filters" scenario,
leaks re-transiting the Tier 1 clique are not the most common
path encoding in Table 1. Table 2 shows they are present
in <35% of leak segments under all scenarios. This result is
an artifact of the BGP decision process; paths learned from
customers are preferred over those exported by peers, and peer
routes are favored over provider-learned ones. So, with all
other selection criteria equal, routes exported from providers
"above" an AS in the topology - e.g. the peering clique -
will generally only be installed and exported if the AS has
Common Leak Segment Encodings
Scenario/Encoding No. exporting ASes % of exporting ASes
No filters 141,797,992 100%
[LR, LP] 14,892,311 11%
[TP] 10,254,707 7%
[LR, LP, LP] 8,683,968 6%
Inferred 108,030,704 100%
[LP, LP] 14,325,960 13%
[LR, LP, LP] 8,675,841 8%
[SR, LP] 5,169,427 5%
Full T1 101,024,444 100%
[LR, LP] 14,246,024 14%
[LR, LP, LP] 8,978,175 9%
[SR, LP, LP] 5,163,786 5%
Full T1 + large ISP lock 69,638,282 100%
[LR, LP] 9,473,820 14%
[LR, LP, LP] 5,899,779 8%
[SR, LP] 3,310,842 5%
Inferred + large ISP lite 8,005,724 100%
[LR] 2,537,276 32%
[LR, TP] 1,281,620 16%
[LR, SP] 653,167 8%
Full T1 + large ISP lite 5,215,232 100%
[LR] 2,386,597 46%
[LR, SP] 679,076 13%
[SR] 412,399 8%
Full T1 + large ISP both 4,649,828 100%
[LR] 2,023,579 44%
[LR, SP] 584,124 13%
[SR] 407,661 9%
Table 1: Most common encodings with number and percentage
of ASes exporting leaks.
not received an update from peers/customers "below". Since
Tier 1 providers cap the routing hierarchy, we expect ASes
will prefer non-Tier 1 routes when provided alternatives by
their connectivity. This dynamic explains why the additional
protection afforded by complete Peerlock within the peering
clique vs. current levels is muted in Fig. 11b.
This effect also brings large ISPs to the fore in our simula-
tions. As noted in [31], these networks are densely connected
with peering links. Their connectivity allows them to bypass
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Transited AS Statistics
Scenario Segment Length Tier 1s Large ISPs Small ISPs
average std. dev % paths average std. dev % paths average std. dev % paths average std. dev
No filters 4.4 1.8 27% 0.2 0.4 89% 2.3 1.6 40% 0.7 0.8
Inferred 4.6 1.8 7% 0.5 0.2 98% 2.5 1.5 45% 0.8 0.9
Full T1 4.7 1.8 0% 0.0 0.0 98% 2.6 1.5 46% 0.8 0.9
Full T1 + large ISP lock 4.8 2.1 0% 0.0 0.0 98% 2.7 1.6 50% 0.9 1.0
Inferred + large ISP lite 2.9 1.0 35% 0.3 0.5 72% 0.6 0.5 42% 0.8 1.0
Full T1 + large ISP lite 2.7 1.1 0% 0.0 0.0 74% 0.6 0.5 47% 1.0 1.1
Full T1 + large ISP both 2.7 1.1 0% 0.0 0.0 71% 0.6 0.5 49% 1.0 1.1
Table 2: Analyzing leak segments by UCLA classes transited.
the Tier 1 clique for many routes - and makes them the primary
channel for leak propagation. The most common encoding
for every scenario in Table 1 includes a large ISP, and 18/21
of the top encodings transit at least one. More than 70% of
leak segments transit these ASes for all protection scenarios
(see Table 2). In fact, in the scenarios without Peerlock-lite
(top four listed), leak segments on average transit - and could
be filtered by - multiple large ISPs. These statistics motivate
the scenarios that place Peerlock-lite filtering at these ASes
(bottom three in tables).
Interestingly, Peerlock-lite diminishes leak usage and prop-
agation unequally as shown in Fig. 11. Fig. 11a shows about
20% of leak segments propagate to 20% or more of the
topology with large ISP Peerlock-lite deployment, but Fig. 11b
shows that fewer than 5% are installed/exported by at least
20% of ASes. Table 1 hints at why this is the case - a
third or more of leak segments in Peerlock-lite scenarios are
exported to large ISP peers, who propagate them directly into
their customer cones (indicated by [LR]). Large ISPs with
any customer-learned or preferential (e.g. shorter) peer-learned
paths to the leak destination will prefer their existing route,
so the [LR] only includes a subset of the leaker’s peers.
Large ISP peers advertising the leak to customers could reach
many ASes, but as a provider-learned route, the leak will be
disadvantaged in the BGP decision process.
We see in Table 1 and Fig. 11 that small ISPs do not
have the connectivity to propagate leaks globally when the
large ISP provider channel is blocked by Peerlock-lite. Under
all scenarios, most leak segments do not transit a small
ISP (though they may be transited during propagation into
customer cones). This feature suggests a less prominent role
in route exchange for these networks relative to large ISPs.
To summarize, we find large ISPs are the most critical
players in halting the spread and installation of Tier 1 leaks.
These networks are interconnected enough to globally dissem-
inate route leaks without the peering clique in many cases.
Moreover, adding simple Peerlock-lite filters at these ASes to
the currently deployed Peerlock filters in the peering clique
causes a 94% reduction in total leak export across 6,840 leak
simulations. Table 1 suggests that peer connections among
ISPs are the largest remaining vulnerability for Tier 1 leaks
given uniform large ISP Peerlock-lite deployment. These chan-
nels are out of reach for Peerlock-lite as described, but could
be mitigated by 1) additional peering relationships/Peerlock
rules to protect important leak targets and/or 2) complementary
leak prevention systems like IRR filtering.
VI. RELATED WORK
Smith et al.’s 2020 study on the efficacy of poison filtering
for inbound re-routing [39] similarly employed the PEERING
framework to probe the behavior of remote networks. That
work encountered some evidence for poison filtering, and
noted that filtering rates increase with poisoned AS degree,
but did not seek to describe the underlying filtering mechanism
or measure which ASes filter poisons. Similarly, Birge-Lee et
al. [2] trialed poisons as a primitive for their novel hijacking at-
tack, SICO. The authors encountered filtering when attempting
to poison large transit networks and measured the data-plane
impact of reduced update propagation, but did not examine
filtering position or prevalence.
Hlavacek et al. [11] introduced the DISCO system for
preventing BGP hijacking. While not designed to prevent route
leaks, the approach taken by DISCO is ideologically similar
to Peerlock - DISCO emphasizes deployability/usability at the
expense of some security guarantees relative to RPKI/ROV
filtering. This line of thinking is informed by a long history
of glacial deployment rates for security features that harden
BGP including BGPSec [44] and the RPKI [8], [29].
Previous work that relies on BGP poisoning often assumes
1) unpoisoned ASes will forward poisoned updates and 2)
poisoned ASes will drop such updates (see Section II-D).
Katz-Bassett et al.’s LIFEGUARD fault detection and reme-
diation system [18], [19], for instance, employs poisoning
to steer ASes around link failures. Smith and Schuchard’s
Nyx defense [40] depends on rerouting with poisons for
DDOS/Link Flooding Attack mitigation. Anwar et al.’s path
discovery technique [1] is also driven by BGP poisoning.
While we discovered little evidence for general poison fil-
tering, the prevalence of Tier 1/large transit network filtering
could present an obstacle to these systems. Specifically, the
assumption that unpoisoned networks will propagate poisons
does not hold in all cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work probes the current deployment of
Peerlock/Peerlock-lite on the control plane with active Internet
measurements in Section IV. We find substantial evidence
for deployment of these leak defense systems, especially
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in large transit networks, and measure a rise in Peerlock
deployment within the peering clique during our experiments.
While the range of protected networks is still narrow within
our observation window, with most filterers protecting only
Tier 1 ASes, many of the most disruptive recent route
leaks contain these networks. Defensive systems [40], [19],
measurement techniques [1], and attacks [2] that may poison
Peerlock-protected networks could inadvertently trigger these
filters, and must not assume poisons will be propagated
by unpoisoned networks. BGP simulators should likewise
account for the presence of Peerlock to faithfully reproduce
control plane behavior.
We also examine how the position and prevalence of fil-
tering impacts leak propagation in the AS-level topology in
Section V. Notably, we find that large ISPs filtering plays a
major role in global leak dissemination, signaling that Tier
1 clique deployment of Peerlock alone is not sufficient to
isolate leaks. Strategic placement of filters at these large transit
providers, which account for fewer than 1% of all ASes,
completely mitigates 80% of simulated Tier 1 route leaks.
The MANRS filtering guide encourages AS PATH filtering
by member ISPs, particularly for screening customer adver-
tisements, and gives Peerlock/Peerlock-lite as examples. But
these systems are not explicitly required, unlike IRR filter-
ing (see [5] Section 4.1.1.1). Given the many indirect/direct
customers these networks serve, ISPs are best equipped and
best incentivized to deploy effective filters. Moreover, neither
Peerlock nor Peerlock-lite is technically complex or burden-
some to configure. Therefore, we argue for broad application
of these common-sense leak prevention techniques by ISPs as
a meaningful step in securing inter-domain routing.
A. Future Directions
Widespread adoption of Peerlock will likely depend on
addressing scalability issues. Rule configuration currently re-
quires non-standard, manual out-of-band communication be-
tween protector/protected ASes. Automating this process is
a crucial step in extending Peerlock beyond core networks.
Communities designating authorized upstreams for routes, as
proposed in [15], could take the place of out-of-band com-
munication. Alternatively, RPKI registration of direct/indirect
customers [16] could distribute trusted topological information
relevant to filtering.
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APPENDIX
Update Propagation: Before (August 2019) and after (May
2020) conducting our control-plane experiments in Section IV,
we performed simple tests to measure 1) the time distribution
for BGP update arrivals at RIPE/RouteViews collectors for
normal and poisoned advertisements issued from PEERING,
and 2) the time distribution for unique ASes seen on AS
PATHs in those updates. The latter is most critical for our
experiments, as we build our filtering inferences from the
presence/absence of ASes on update AS PATHs.
These tests consisted of an explicit /24 withdrawal followed
by a one hour waiting period, then a normal /24 advertise-
ment. We listened for updates for the /24 at all BGPStream
collectors, and recorded the arrival times of updates for the
advertised prefix for one hour. We also noted when unique
ASes were first seen on the updates’ AS PATHs. This process
(withdraw, update, listen) was repeated five times. We con-
ducted the same process with a poisoned /24 advertisement,
for a total of 10 advertisements per experiment.
The results are shown below, Figs.12 and 13. About 80% of
updates triggered by a normal or poisoned /24 advertisement
that arrived within an hour were received within 30 minutes
post-origination in the August experiment. In May, more than
95% of updates fell within this period. More importantly, for
every experiment, all unique ASes seen on update paths over
the hour listening window arrived within the first 25 minutes
post-origination. Over 95% of unique ASes were seen within
7 minutes post-origination.
14
(a) August results. (b) May results.
Fig. 12: Update arrival time CDF. Each of five propagation experiments is illustrated in a different color.
(a) August results. (b) May results.
Fig. 13: Unique AS arrival time CDF. Each of five propagation experiments is illustrated in a different color.
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